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Abstract  
Fraud is one of the major ethical issues in the credit card industry. The main aims are, firstly, to identify the different 
types of credit card fraud, and, secondly, to review alternative techniques that have been used in fraud detection. The 
sub-aim is to present, compare and analyze recently published findings in credit card fraud detection. This article 
defines common terms in credit card fraud and highlights key statistics and figures in this field. Depending on the type 
of fraud faced by banks or credit card companies, various measures can be adopted and implemented. The proposals 
made in this paper are likely to have beneficial attributes in terms of cost savings and time efficiency. The significance 
of the application of the techniques reviewed here is in the minimization of credit card fraud. Yet there are still ethical 
issues when genuine credit card customers are misclassified as fraudulent.  
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Introduction
For some time, there has been a strong interest in the 
ethics of banking (Molyneaux, 2007; George, 1992), 
as well as the moral complexity of fraudulent behavior 
(Clarke, 1994). Fraud means obtaining services/goods 
and/or money by unethical means, and is a growing 
problem all over the world nowadays. Fraud deals with 
cases involving criminal purposes that, mostly, are 
difficult to identify. Credit cards are one of the most 
famous targets of fraud but not the only one; fraud can 
occur with any type of credit products, such as
personal loans, home loans, and retail. Furthermore, 
the face of fraud has changed dramatically during the 
last few decades as technologies have changed and 
developed. A critical task to help businesses, and 
financial institutions including banks is to take steps to 
prevent fraud and to deal with it efficiently and 
effectively, when it does happen (Anderson, 2007). 
Anderson (2007) has identified and explained the 
different types of fraud, which are as many and 
varied as the financial institution’s products and 
technologies, as shown in Figure 1.  
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Fig. 1. Types of fraud 
The?main aims are, firstly, to identify the different 
types of credit card fraud, and, secondly, to review 
alternative techniques that have been used in fraud 
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detection. The focus here is in Europe, and so 
ethical issues arising from other cultures are not 
taken into account; but for a discussion of these the 
reader is referred to Chepaitis (1997) and Gichure 
(2000). Indeed, transaction products, including 
credit cards, are the most vulnerable to fraud. On the 
other hand, other products such as personal loans 
and retail are also at risk, and have serious ethical 
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implications for banks and credit card companies. 
Credit card fraud may happen in various ways, 
which depend on the type of fraud concerned; it 
encapsulates bankruptcy fraud, theft fraud / 
counterfeit fraud, application fraud and behavioral 
fraud. Each of these sub-fraud categories has its own 
definition and specificity. Techniques to fight 
against those are reviewed, and examples from 
European markets are presented.  
Euromonitor International (2006) stated that, 
impressively, 120 million cards (i.e., debit cards, 
credit cards, and charge cards) were brought into use 
in 2004 in Germany, and that the total transaction 
value generated by cards reached some €375 billion 
in 2004, up nearly 4% from 2003, including cash 
withdrawals. Because of the increasing usage of 
cards for payments, the amount spent on sales and 
internet purchases with any kind of cards has 
jumped by 5% reaching €170 billion. However, cash 
withdrawals faced a lower growth. Those new 
patterns in customer payment behavior are probably 
correlated assuming that customers substitute cash 
payments for card-payments (Euromonitor 
International, 2006). 
Focusing on the credit card business, in the German 
market, for example, the word “Kreditkarte” refers 
to both charge cards and credit cards. There is no 
clear distinction between the two, whereas in 
English the different products have their own terms. 
To distinguish between the two products, debit card 
and credit card, credit card banks have offered the 
possibility to their customers to revolve their credit 
through credit cards. This service or credit is also a 
way to attract them. However, even if customers 
have the possibility to revolve credit, not all of them 
use this service. Nevertheless, in 2004, credit cards 
enjoyed a faster growth than charge cards 
(Euromonitor International, 2006). 
Source: PwC. This is cited in DRF EU Speech on April 19th
2005 in Amsterdam (Pago e-Transaction Services GmbH, 
2005). 
Fig. 2. Transaction products in Europe 
In 2005, as shown in Figure 21, the market of 
transaction products in Europe is split into two 
groups. The credit card group leads the market. This 
group includes some of the following countries: 
Spain, Belgium, Italy, and Greece. In two countries, 
credit cards have no competitors in terms of 
transaction product. Those two countries are the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. On the other hand, 
another group of country uses mostly debit cards; it 
is especially the case for Sweden. However, for this 
group, the standard deviation between the two types 
of transaction product is less visible than for the 
other group. As to Germany, for example, the 
German market appears to be underserved by credit 
cards. Indeed, payment by cards has been increasing 
in the German market over the past few years. The 
market for credit and charge cards is forecast to 
grow by 23.3% from 2004 to 2009, to reach a value 
of €56,477 million (Euromonitor International, 
2006).  
With this extensive use of credit card, fraud appears 
as a major issue in the credit card business. In the 
European Union, the first signs could have been 
seen in the United Kingdom in the 90s. In fact, total 
losses through credit card fraud in the United 
Kingdom have been growing rapidly (1997, ?122 
million; 1998, ?135 million; 1999, ?188 million; 
2000, ?293 million [Association for Payment 
Clearing Services London (APACS), no date]. Yet, 
in 2006, APACS reported ?423 million losses, a 
decrease of nearly £80 million over the previous two 
years. The main reason for this improvement is the 
success of chip & PIN that has led to a decrease of 
face-to-face fraud. However, if mail-non-receipt 
fraud and lost and stolen card fraud are decreasing, 
counterfeit card fraud and card-not-present (CNP) 
fraud are increasing although they are increasing at 
reducing rates (APACS, no date).  
Source: DRF EU Speech, Amsterdam, April 19th 2005 (Pago e-
Transaction Services GmbH, 2005) 
Fig. 3. Fraud distribution in Europe 
The explosion of credit card fraud is not only due to 
the constant increase of card usage but also to the 
ease of perpetuating credit card fraud. The 
complexity of credit card fraud is that it may be 
committed in various ways, including theft fraud, 
application fraud, counterfeit fraud, bankruptcy 
fraud. In 2005, stolen and counterfeit frauds 
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dominated the European fraud market, as shown in 
Figure 3. By not paying enough attention to fraud 
prevention or detection, the risk for the bank is that 
“credit card fraud remains usually undetected until 
long after the criminal has completed the crime” 
(Caminer, 1985; Bolton & Hand, 2001). Therefore, 
it will generate irrecoverable costs for the bank.  
This paper suggests measures to reduce the expected 
loss and is organized as follows: section 1 defines 
the basic terms used in fraud with explanations in 
the context of the credit card business; section 2 
reviews the main types of credit card fraud; section 
3 discusses detection techniques; and, finally, the 
last section concludes the paper.  
1. Terms  
Credit is a method of selling goods or services 
without the buyer having cash in hand. A credit card 
is only an automatic way of offering credit to a 
consumer. Today, every credit card carries an 
identifying number that speeds shopping 
transactions. According to Encyclopedia Britannica 
(no date), "the use of credit cards originated in the 
United States during the 1920s, when individual 
firms, such as oil companies and hotel chains, 
began issuing them to customers." However, 
references to credit cards have been made as far 
back as 1890 in Europe. Early credit cards 
involved sales directly between the merchant 
offering the credit and credit card, and that 
merchant's customer. Around 1938, companies 
started to accept each other's cards. Nowadays, 
credit cards allow you to make purchases with 
countless third parties (Bellis, no date). 
In Europe, the most well-known credit card 
companies are arguably Barclaycard, Citibank, and 
American Express, offering different types of 
products depending on their portfolio. Depending 
on the product offered, the services associated 
with the card may be different. Interest rate, card 
fees, exchange rate fee, late payment fee, credit 
limit, terms and conditions, are elements that can 
vary from one bank to another and from one 
product to another.  
In the credit card business, fraud occurs when a 
lender is fooled by a borrower offering him/her 
purchases, believing that the borrower credit card 
account will provide payment for this purchase. 
Ideally, no payment will be made. If the payment is 
made, the credit card issuer will reclaim the amount 
paid. Today, with the expansion of e-commerce, it is 
on the internet that half of all credit card fraud is 
conducted. Fraudsters have usually connections with 
the affected business. In the credit card business, it 
can be an internal party but most likely an external 
party. As an external party, fraud is committed 
being a prospective/existing customer or a 
prospective/existing supplier. Three different 
profiles can be identified for external fraudsters: the 
average offender, criminal offender, and organized 
crime offender (Phua et al., 2005).  
Average offenders display random and/or occasional 
dishonest behavior when there is opportunity, 
sudden temptation, or when suffering from financial 
hardship. In contrast, the more risky external 
fraudsters are individual criminal offenders and 
organized/group crime offenders 
(professional/career fraudsters) because they 
repeatedly disguise their true identities and/or 
evolve their modus operandi over time to 
approximate legal forms and to counter detection 
systems (Phua et al., 2006; Phua et al., 2004). 
For many companies sometimes dealing with 
millions of external parties, it is cost-prohibitive to 
manually check the majority of the external parties’ 
identity and activities. Indeed, to investigate each 
suspicious transaction, they incur a direct overhead 
cost for each of them. If the amount of a transaction 
is smaller than the cost of the overhead, 
investigating is not worthwhile even if it seems 
suspicious (Chan et al., 1999; Oscherwitz, 2005). In 
order to avoid these overheads and depending on the 
type of fraud committed, diverse solutions can be 
implemented. 
2. Types of fraud 
2.1. Bankruptcy fraud. This section focuses on 
bankruptcy fraud and advises the use of credit report 
from credit bureaux as a source of information 
regarding the applicants’ public records as well as a 
possible implementation of a bankruptcy model. 
Bankruptcy fraud is one of the most difficult types 
of fraud to predict. However, some methods or 
techniques may help in its prevention. Bankruptcy 
fraud means using a credit card while being 
insolvent. In other words, purchasers use credit 
cards knowing that they are not able to pay for their 
purchases. The bank will send them an order to pay. 
However, the customers will be recognized as being 
in a state of personal bankruptcy and not able to 
recover their debts. The bank will have to cover the 
losses itself. Usually, this type of fraud loss is not 
included in the calculation of the fraud loss 
provision as it is considered a charge-off loss. The 
only way to prevent this bankruptcy fraud is by 
doing a pre-check with credit bureaux in order to be 
informed about the banking history of the 
customers.  
In Germany, for example, some of the most used 
credit bureaux are SCHUFA and CEG. SCHUFA, 
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as the leading credit bureau in Germany, offers 
solutions to its clients over the whole risk 
management process; 62 million records are stored 
in their database. Credit bureaux usually report on 
diverse sectors, such as private banks, savings bank, 
cooperative banks, special credit institutes etc., and 
credit card companies.  
Usually, the process is as follows: the bank passes 
an enquiry to the credit bureau. The enquiry 
includes identification information required by the 
credit bureau. In a counter party transaction, the 
credit bureau sends a credit report for this single 
individual including personal particulars, details of 
non-compliance with contractual obligations, 
information from public directories and additional 
positive information such as repayment of loans 
according to contract at or before maturity. Some 
credit bureaux are also able to trace the address of 
a specific individual, who has moved to an 
‘unknown’ address. 
Information in the credit bureau data is gathered 
from many different sources. Banks, consumer 
finance companies, credit unions, and collection 
agencies are some of the entities that periodically 
report to the credit bureaux. Data are also obtained 
from state and federal courts on judgments, liens, 
and bankruptcy filings; the credit bureaux use third 
parties to gather information. Typically, individual 
financial companies and others report to the credit 
bureau every month. The timing of updates from the 
courts can vary; depending on the size of the court, 
bankruptcies are usually updated daily. A credit file 
is created when an individual applies for, or uses, 
credit or a public record is reported to the credit 
bureau. Once a credit file is established for an 
individual, updates are posted on the consumer’s 
credit-seeking behavior, payment and purchase 
behavior, and any changes to the public records. 
The public records section of a credit report contains 
severe derogatory information on subjects, such as 
bankruptcy, judgment, garnishment, foreclosure, 
lien, and collection accounts. Bankruptcy 
information, obtained from the federal courts, 
covers all ‘chapters’ of the bankruptcy code and 
details whether the court discharged or dismissed 
the bankruptcy petition, and the amount of the 
bankruptcy. Judgment, foreclosure, and lien records 
from both state and federal courts list the amounts in 
dispute and whether a judgment or lien was satisfied 
or released. Collection items are posted in the public 
record section if they are collected by a third-party 
collections agency. The amount collected by the 
original credit-granting firm may also be reported in 
the trade-line section of the file (Thomas et al., 
2002). Items are kept in the public records’ section 
of the credit file for varying lengths of time, 
depending on the event and the credit bureau. 
Once the bank has received the credit report from 
the credit bureau, the bank is free to decide its 
policy in terms of rejection criteria. On the one 
hand, the bank can decide to adopt a conservative 
behavior and to reduce the access to its product to a 
certain type of customer. On the other hand, the 
bank can allow itself to be exposed by accepting 
such a high risk in terms of credit and fraud. This 
decision depends on the type of business and thus, 
portfolio, the bank is willing to manage. The source 
of criteria that have a significant impact in 
identifying insolvency cases will be collection and 
court information.  
Other methods to detect bankruptcy fraud are few. 
However, Foster & Stine (2004) presented a model 
to predict personal bankruptcy among users of credit 
card. The paper described a model based on 
standard regression techniques. The method is based 
on a step wise regression with some modifications. 
Firstly, the model included interactions and 
indicator functions to capture respectively non-
linearities and missing values. Secondly, it was 
based on modern decision theoretic variable 
selection criteria. Thirdly, the method used to 
predict the standard error was rather conservative to 
deal with heteroscedastic data (Foster & Stine, 
2004). Combining a model to predict bankruptcy 
with credit reports can be suggested as a solution 
against bankruptcy fraud. 
2.2. Theft fraud/counterfeit fraud. This section 
focuses on theft fraud and counterfeit fraud, which 
are related to each other. Theft fraud means using a 
card that is not yours. The perpetrator will steal the 
card of someone else and use it as many times as 
possible before the card is blocked. The sooner the 
owner will react and contact the bank, the faster the 
bank will take measures to stop the thief. Similarly, 
counterfeit fraud occurs when the credit card is used 
remotely; only the credit card details are needed. At 
one point, one will copy your card number and 
codes and use it via certain web-sites, where no 
signature or physical cards are required. Recently, 
Pago, one of the leading international acquiring & 
payment service providers, reveals in its Pago 
Report (2005) that credit card fraud is a growing 
threat to businesses selling goods or services 
through the internet. On-line merchants are at risk 
because they have to offer their clients payment by 
credit card. In cases where fraudsters use stolen or 
manipulated credit card data the merchant loses 
money because of so-called "charge-backs"2. Note 
that charge-backs are generated if credit card 
holders object to items on their monthly credit card 
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statements because they were not responsible for the 
purchase transactions.
According to the Pago Report (2005), although the 
average charge-back ratio in European e-commerce 
seems to be quite low, at only 0.83 percent, 
significant concerns are revealed in detailed 
analysis. The share of charge-backs, for instance, 
resulting from manipulated credit card data has risen 
from just over 4 per cent in 2003 to more than 7 per 
cent in 2004. This is presumably due to the overall 
increase in organized credit card fraud. Yet, 
according to the Pago Report (2005), the 
relationship between charge-back ratio and shopping 
cart value has deteriorated too; whereas the charge-
back ratio for transactions of less than 10 Euros is 
only 0.28 per cent, and 3.71 per cent of transactions 
over 500 Euros end up as a chargeback. 
Interestingly, the charge-back ratio for consumers 
from Germany, at 0.31 per cent, is much lower than 
that for all other European consumers. 
Source: Pago e-Transaction Services (Pago Report, 2005). This 
is cited in the European e-Business Market Watch. ICT 
Security, e-Invoicing and e-Payment Activities in European 
Enterprises, Special Report, September, 2005. 
Fig. 4. Average transaction values in European shops by 
consumer origin 
Consumer behavior in making e-payments has 
changed from 2003 to 2004 as shown in Figure 4. 
On the one hand, the average transaction values for 
German consumers has not changed, at €55, while 
the average value generated from the rest of Europe 
by purchases from consumers was lower in 2004 
than in 2003, at €79 and €89, respectively. On the 
other hand, non-Europeans have the highest average 
value, at €106 in 2003, while it was the lowest value 
in 2004, at €51; they were overtaken by UK 
shoppers, who generated an average value of €114, 
the highest in 2004. Therefore, the average 
transaction value has changed significantly from 
2003 to 2004.  
A conclusion that could result from those statistics 
could be that the German credit card market is less 
affected by credit card fraud than the rest of Europe. 
However, one could consider that it is a matter of 
time before the first signs appear. Detecting this 
type of fraud is a must in the credit card business. 
Even though the task is not easy, this type of fraud 
can be detected, thanks to reports such as ‘over 
limit’ reports. ‘Over limit’ reports provide a daily 
list of customers that have exceeded their credit 
limit. A certain degree of tolerance may be 
accepted. For the credit card listed, the customers 
are contacted and if they do not react, the card is 
blocked. Other reports are vintage reports which 
identify delinquent customers, i.e. transaction 
reports which identify suspicious transactions.  
A fraudulent transaction is difficult to detect and to 
define. Nevertheless, ATM transactions of large 
amounts are suspicious and demand contact with the 
customer. Purchases of goods for a larger amount 
than normal will also be notified to the customer as 
well as abnormal overseas spending patterns. 
Fraudulent transactions are usually impossible to 
prevent as they occur in a really short period of 
time. However, once a card is identified, the card is 
blocked.
2.3. Application fraud. Application fraud is when 
someone applies for a credit card with false 
information. To detect application fraud, the 
solution is to implement a fraud system that allows 
identifying suspicious applications. To detect 
application fraud, two different situations have to be 
distinguished: when applications come from a same 
individual with the same details, the so-called 
duplicates, and when applications come from 
different individuals with similar details, the so-
called identity fraudsters. 
In most banks, to be eligible for a credit card, 
applicants need to complete an application form. 
This application form is mandatory except for social 
fields. The information required includes 
identification information, location information, 
contact information, confidential information and 
additional information. Recurrent information 
available would be for identification purposes, such 
as the full name and the date of birth. The applicant 
would inform the bank about his/her location 
details: the address, the postal code, the city and the 
country. The bank would also ask for contact 
details, such as e-mail address, land-line and mobile 
phone numbers. Confidential information will be the 
password. In addition, the gender will be given. All 
those characteristics may be used while searching 
for duplicates. 
To identify the so-called duplicates, cross-matching 
techniques are in common use. Rather than using 
statistical techniques, another method easy to 
implement is cross-matching. For instance, simple 
queries that give fast results are to cross-identify 
information with location details. Examples would 
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be “last name and date of birth and postal code and 
address” or “last name and address and e-mail and 
gender”. By those queries, individuals with more 
than one card are identified. Those are quite 
simplistic queries but will remove most duplicates 
from the system. Note that duplicates may usually 
be genuine. Customers can reapply filling in a new 
address or spelling differently in one of the fields. 
By contrast, identity crime, as it is named, is 
perpetrated by real criminals filling wrong 
application data consciously.  
Phua et al. (2006) explain that application fraud, a 
manifestation of identity crime, occurs when 
application form(s) contain plausible, and synthetic 
(identity fraud), or real but stolen identity 
information (identity theft). According to ID 
Analytics (2004), and based on 300 million opened 
fraudulent account applications, 88% of those 
fraudulent accounts were opened by using identity 
fraud techniques. According to the same study, 
identity fraud counts for three quarters of the total 
loss generated by identity crime. 
Cross-matching works on the premise that once 
someone has been successful in perpetrating a fraud, 
they will attempt to repeat their success with another 
lender; cross-matching can then detect identity 
crime. Therefore, some lenders have begun to send 
details of applications into a central data bank, 
where some matching algorithms operate to identify 
common features. Many matching rules will be 
applied and it is acknowledged that many false-
positive cases will be identified (Thomas et al., 
2004). Cross-matching techniques have been 
recommended by Phua et al. (2006), who develop a 
technique for generating numeric suspicious scores 
on credit applications based on implicit links to each 
other. The purpose is to derive an accurate suspicion 
score for all incoming current or new applications in 
real time (Phua et al., 2006).  
Solutions: to improve the pair-wise matching 
technique, the authors combined pair-wise matching 
and suspicious behavior. For instance, considering 
the number of applications is one way to define a 
suspicious behavior. Another criterion is the number 
of active cards corresponding to the combination of 
fields. The issue is to define relevant fields. The 
design of pair-wise matching for dynamic 
applications has to be effective and efficient (Phua 
et al., 2006). In the credit card business, one key 
element is the address. It is where the card will be 
sent. The only way for fraudsters to get several 
cards is to pick them at one address or several 
addresses. If the cards are sent to different addresses 
under different names, application fraud detection is 
rather difficult. Those fraudsters will be identified 
later on once they use the cards and behave 
according to their profile (over their limit, off-line 
transactions, abnormal transaction, delinquency 
status, etc.). However, those giving the same 
address under different names can be identified.
A proposal which has been tested is to pair-wise the 
number of applications, the address, the postal code 
and the number of active cards. In order to pair-wise 
correctly, a first step is to “clean” the applications. 
For instance, consider a German address; the system 
has to be developed in a way that “Hauptstr.29” will 
be pair-wised with “Hauptstrasse29” or that 
“Heidestrasse85” will be pair-wised with 
“Heidestr.85”. The second step is similar for the 
postal code; “77756” has to pair-wised with “D-
77756”. This pre-work on the data is fundamental to 
prevent fraud applications. Fraudsters will always 
try to find new ways to beat the system, which is 
why those control checks have to be up-dated as 
often as possible.
A suggestion is to have three levels of risk for the 
different fraudulent behavior: level 1: “high risk” – 
this group contains all individuals with the same 
address and postal code and at least one active card 
listed 10 or more times; level 2: “medium risk” – 
this group contains all individuals with the same 
address and postal code and at least one active card 
listed at least 5 times but less than 10 times; and 
level 3: “low risk” – this group contains all 
individuals with the same address and postal code 
and at least one active card listed at least twice but 
less than 5 times. 
Applications: the technique was applied to a full 
application data set supplied by a German bank in 
2006. For banking secrecy reasons, only a 
summary of the results obtained is presented 
below. After applying this technique, the level 1 
list contains a few cases but with a high 
probability of being fraudsters. All individuals 
mentioned in this list had their cards closed to 
avoid any risk due to their high risk profile. The 
situation is more complex for the other list. The 
level 2 list is still restricted enough to be checked 
on a case by case basis. Credit and collection 
officers considered that half of the cases in this 
list could be considered as suspicious fraudulent 
behavior. For the last list and the largest, the work 
is fairly heavy. Less than one third of those 
customers are suspicious. In order to maximize 
the time efficiency and the overhead costs, an 
option is to include a new element in the query; 
this element can be the five first digits of the 
phone numbers, the email address, and the 
password, for example, those new queries can be 
applied to the level 2 list and level 3 list. 
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This system is not aimed to provide a 100% 
solution, but it is a first step to control application 
fraud. Professional fraudsters will, of course, not be 
identified by such techniques but amateurs will. 
Another solution that has been investigated is a web 
service for credit card detection based on 
collaboration amongst different banks (Chiu & Tsai, 
2004; Fan, 2004). Those banks share their 
information about fraudsters. This idea is interesting 
but difficult to implement as it requires the 
cooperation of different banks, for banks may not be 
willing to share their information due to competition 
in the market, and for legal reasons, such as data 
protection law. 
Fraudsters, responsible for identity crime that will 
remain in the system after this first check, are prone 
to commit behavioral fraud and, therefore, will be 
identified further on thanks to a fraud scorecard. 
2.4. Behavioral fraud. Behavioral fraud occurs 
when details of legitimate cards have been obtained 
fraudulently and sales are made on a ‘cardholder 
present’ basis. These sales include telephone sales 
and e-commerce transactions, where only the card 
details are required (Bolton & Hand, 2002). 
Behavioral fraud can be detected by implementing a 
fraud scorecard predicting which customers are 
likely to default. Traditional credit scorecards are 
used to detect customers who are likely to default, 
and the reasons for this may include fraud (Bolton 
& Hand, 2002). Regarding the process, using 
scoring for fraud prevention is similar to any other 
use, including profit, default, and collection. The 
score reflects experience of past cases, and the result 
is a binary outcome: a genuine customer or a 
fraudster.
The key difference is that professional fraudsters 
will make their application look very genuine. 
Therefore, some scoring developments for fraud 
prevention have not proved worthwhile because 
they are unable to differentiate between genuine 
applications and fraudulent applications. On the 
other hand, if one uses scoring as a fraud check in 
addition to using a different scoring model as a 
credit risk check, any improvement will add value. 
However, the value of this additional check relies on 
it not presenting too many false-positive cases 
(Thomas et al., 2004). To detect fraudulent 
applications is possible once they have gone 
through the system and have been bank customers 
for a certain time. To build a scorecard, it is 
important to define what the profile of a 
fraudulent customer is, and especially the 
cardholder level profiles encapsulating normal 
transaction patterns, such as frequency of use, 
typical value range, types of goods purchased, 
transaction types, retailer profiles, cash usage, 
balance and payment histories, overseas spending 
patterns and daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal 
patterns (Thomas et al., 2004; Siddiqi, 2006). 
With application fraud, fraudsters will only be 
detected while accounts are sent out or repayment 
dates begin to pass. Time delays are the main issues 
with suspicious scorecards. Generally, a bank would 
need a 12-month period to collect enough relevant 
data to build this model and to have such a model 
fully implemented (Thomas et al., 2002).  
3. Detection techniques 
3.1. Decision tree. The idea of a similarity tree 
using decision tree logic has been developed. A 
similarity tree is defined recursively: nodes are 
labelled with attribute names, edges are labelled 
with values of attributes that satisfy some condition 
and ‘leaves’ that contain an intensity factor which is 
defined as the ratio of the number of transactions 
that satisfy these condition(s) over the total 
number of legitimate transaction in the behavior 
(Kokkinaki, 1997). The advantage of the method 
that is suggested is that it is easy to implement, to 
understand and to display. However, a 
disadvantage of this system is the requirements to 
check each transaction one by one. Nevertheless, 
similarity trees have given proven results [Fan et 
al. (2001) also worked on decision trees and 
especially on an inductive decision tree in order to 
establish an intrusion detection system, for 
another type of fraud].  
3.2. Genetic algorithms and other algorithms. 
Algorithms are often recommended as predictive 
methods as a means of detecting fraud. One 
algorithm that has been suggested by Bentley et al. 
(2000) is based on genetic programming in order to 
establish logic rules capable of classifying credit 
card transactions into suspicious and non-suspicious 
classes. Basically, this method follows the scoring 
process. In the experiment described in their 
study, the database was made of 4,000 
transactions with 62 fields. As for the similarity 
tree, training and testing samples were employed. 
Different types of rules were tested with the 
different fields. The best rule is the one with the 
highest predictability. Their method has proven 
results for real home insurance data and could be 
one efficient method against credit card fraud. 
Chan et al. (1999) also developed an algorithm to 
predict suspect behavior. The originality of their 
research is that the model is evaluated and rated by a 
cost model, whereas other studies use evaluation 
based on their prediction rate/the true positive rate 
and the error rate/the false negative rate. Wheeler & 
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Aitken (2000) developed the idea of combining 
algorithms to maximize the power of prediction. In 
their article, they present different algorithms: 
diagnostic algorithms, diagnostic resolution 
strategies, probabilistic curve algorithms, best 
match algorithms, negative selection algorithms, 
and density selection algorithms. They conclude 
from their investigation that neighborhood-based 
and probabilistic algorithms have been shown to be 
appropriate techniques for classification, and may 
be further enhanced using additional diagnostic 
algorithms for decision-making in borderlines 
cases, and for calculating confidence and relative 
risk measures. 
3.3. Clustering techniques. Bolton & Hand (2002) 
suggest two clustering techniques for behavioral 
fraud. The peer group analysis is a system that 
allows identifying accounts that are behaving 
differently from others at one moment in time 
whereas they were behaving the same previously. 
Those accounts are then flagged as suspicious. 
Fraud analysts have then to investigate those cases. 
The hypothesis of the peer group analysis is that if 
accounts behave the same for a certain period of 
time and then one account is behaving significantly 
differently, this account has to be notified. Break-
point analysis uses a different approach. The 
hypothesis is that if a change of card usage is 
notified on an individual basis, the account has to be 
investigated. In other words, based on the 
transactions of a single card, the break-point 
analysis can identify suspicious behavior. Signals of 
suspicious behavior are a sudden transaction for a 
high amount, and a high frequency of usage. 
Table 1. A summary of studies investigating different statistical techniques in credit card fraud 
Study Country Method Details 
Aleskerov et al. 
(1997) Germany Neural networks Card-watch 
Bently et al. 
(2000) UK Genetic programming Logic rules and scoring process 
Bolton & Hand 
(2002) UK Clustering techniques Peer group analysis and break point analysis 
Brause et al. 
(1999a) Germany
Data mining techniques & 
neural networks Data mining application combined probabilistic and neuro-adaptive approach 
Chan et al. (1999) USA Algorithms Suspect behavioral prediction 
Dorronsoro et al. 
(1997) Spain Neural networks Neural classifier 
Ezawa & Norton 
(1996) USA Bayesian networks Telecommunication industry 
Fan et al. (2001) USA Decision tree Inductive decision tree 
Ghosh & Reilly 
(1994) USA Neural networks FDS (fraud detection system) 
Kim & Kim (2002) Korea Neural classifier Improving detection efficiency and focusing on bias of training sample as in skewed distribution. To reduce “mis-detections”. 
Kokkinaki (1997) Cyprus Decision tree Similarity tree based on decision tree logic 
Leonard (1995) Canada Expert system Rule-based Expert system for fraud detection (fraud modelling) 
Maes et al. (2002) USA Bayesian networks & neural networks Credit card industry, back-propagation of error signals 
Quah & Sriganesh 
(2007) Singapore Neural networks Self-Organizing Map (SOM) through real-time fraud detection system 
Wheeler & Aitken 
(2000) UK Combining algorithms 
Diagnostic algorithms; diagnostic resolution strategies; probabilistic curve algorithm; best 
match algorithm; negative selection algorithms; density selection algorithms and approaches 
Zaslavsky & 
Strizkak (2006) Ukraine Neural networks SOM, algorithm for detection of fraudulent operations in payment system 
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3.4. Neural networks. Neural networks are also 
often recommended for fraud detection. Dorronsoro 
et al. (1997) developed a technically accessible on-
line fraud detection system, based on a neural 
classifier. However, the main constraint is that data 
need to be clustered by type of account. Similar 
concepts are: Card watch (Aleskerov et al., 1997); 
Back-propagation of error signals (Maes et al., 
2002); FDS (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994); SOM (Quah & 
Sriganesh, 2008; Zaslavsky & Strizkak, 2006); 
improving detection efficiency “mis-detections” 
(Kim & Kim, 2002). Data mining tools, such as 
‘Clementine’ allow the use of neural network 
technologies, which have been used in credit card 
fraud (Brause et al., 1999a; Brause et al., 1999b).  
Bayesian networks are also one technique to detect 
fraud, and have been applied to detect fraud in the 
telecommunications industry (Ezawa & Norton, 
1996) and also in the credit card industry (Maes et 
al., 2002). Results from this technique are 
optimistic. However, the time constraint is one main 
disadvantage of such a technique, especially 
compared with neural networks (Maes et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, expert systems have also been used in 
credit card fraud using a rule-based expert system 
(Leonard, 1995).  
However, no matter the statistical techniques 
chosen, the fraud detection system will need to fulfil 
some conditions. As the number of fraudulent 
transactions is much less than the total number of 
transactions, the system will have to handle skewed 
distributions of the data. Otherwise, the data need to 
be split into training samples, where the distribution 
is less skewed (Chan et al., 1997). The system has to 
be accurate with actual performing classifiers and to 
be capable of handling noise in the data; a suggested 
solution is to clean the data (Fawcett & Provost, 
1997). The system should also be able to handle 
overlaps; fraudulent transactions may be similar to 
normal transactions. As fraudsters reinvent new 
techniques constantly, the system needs to be 
adaptive and evaluated regularly. A cost profit 
analysis is also a must in fraud detection to avoid 
spending time on uneconomic cases.  
For new issuing banks, a proposal would be to rely 
on credit bureaux score in order to control fraud and 
avoid expected losses. Even though those scorecards 
are primarily used to predict defaulting customers, 
one could use them to detect fraud, since fraud and 
default are strongly correlated. Generic scoring 
systems are typically based on a sample from the 
past experiences of several lenders. Generic 
systems are sold to creditors who believe they will 
find them useful. The systems are often available 
on a transaction as well as a purchase basis 
(Thomas et al., 2004). 
The most dominant generic models are those 
available through the major credit bureaux, and 
influence most credit decisions made by major 
creditors. A credit bureaux score may be included in 
the credit report of the individual or as a stand-alone 
product. Each bureau has its own models, and the 
competition is intense. Generic models were 
developed by scoring vendors working with credit 
bureau development staff. Though only information 
from a single credit bureau is used in model 
development, sample sizes typically range from the 
hundreds of thousands to over a million files. In 
general, the predictive powers of the generic bureau 
models are outstanding, and comparable with those 
of customized models. 
Generally, a credit bureau scorecard is developed 
into a model for forecasting the payment behavior of 
an applicant using the characteristic data available 
for that applicant. Typically, credit bureau scores are 
based on external data which have been calibrated in 
such a way that, with regard to age and gender, for 
example, they reflect the population. The scorecard 
is also established with variables, such as risk 
indicator, social status, family status, type of house 
and post code.  
For this purpose, Fair Isaac, for example, produces 
software for detecting credit card fraud. Their 
solution is based on neural network techniques 
processing transactional, cardholder, and merchant 
data to detect fraudulent activity. Experian also has 
developed its own solution called Hunter. Pago 
fraud screening is also one tool used for fraud 
prevention. However, those solutions are often 
costly, yet unaffordable for small banks. 
It can be argued that one ethical problem that arises 
from the use of detection techniques, to predict 
fraudulent and genuine customers, is that a 
technique may predict some customers as genuine, 
when actually they are fraudulent, and other 
customers as fraudulent, when actually they are 
genuine. In terms of justice, these errors should be 
minimized. However, from the bank’s own 
perspective the cost of predicting as genuine a 
customer who is actually fraudulent is much higher 
than the cost to the bank of predicting as fraudulent 
a customer who is actually genuine. In the latter 
case the bank loses the opportunity cost of the 
associated profit margin that would have been 
earned. However, in the former case the bank loses 
the capital value of the loan as well as the interest. 
To operate in the best interests of the bank’s 
shareholders its objective should be to minimize the 
misclassification costs rather than to minimize the 
propensity to incorrectly classify customers as 
fraudulent or genuine. Yet, it would be unethical to 
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reject genuine customers that happened to have the 
same array of characteristics as those of fraudulent 
customers.  
Conclusion  
Clearly, credit card fraud is an act of criminal 
dishonesty. This article has reviewed recent findings 
in the credit card field. This paper has identified the 
different types of fraud, such as bankruptcy fraud, 
counterfeit fraud, theft fraud, application fraud and 
behavioral fraud, and discussed measures to detect 
them. Such measures have included pair-wise 
matching, decision trees, clustering techniques, 
neural networks, and genetic algorithms. 
From an ethical perspective, it can be argued that 
banks and credit card companies should attempt to 
detect all fraudulent cases. Yet, the unprofessional 
fraudster is unlikely to operate on the scale of the 
professional fraudster and so the costs to the bank of 
their detection may be uneconomic. The bank would 
then be faced with an ethical dilemma. Should they 
try to detect such fraudulent cases or should they act 
in shareholder interests and avoid uneconomic costs? 
As the next step in this research program, the focus 
will be upon the implementation of a ‘suspicious’ 
scorecard on a real data-set and its evaluation. The 
main tasks will be to build scoring models to predict 
fraudulent behavior, taking into account the fields of 
behavior that relate to the different types of credit card 
fraud identified in this paper, and to evaluate the 
associated ethical implications. The plan is to take one 
of the European countries, probably Germany, and 
then to extend the research to other EU countries. 
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Notes
1. All the figures in this paper are used with permission of Pago e-Transaction Services GmbH, October 2007. 
2. For more details see Appendix A: ‘Success rates and charge-back ratios’ (Pago Report, 2007). 
Appendix A. Success rates and chargeback ratios 
It can be shown from Figure A.1 that success rates have deteriorated significantly in Germany (D), and the same for 
consumers in the rest of Europe (RE), except for rates for UK consumers and consumers outside Europe (NE) which 
are higher than previously. The success rate for credit card holders from the rest of Europe is less than 65%*. 
Source: Pago e-Transaction Services GmbH, Pago Report, 2007. 
Fig. A.1. Success rates for credit card transactions by consumer country, in all shops 
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Source: Pago e-Transaction Services GmbH, Pago Report, 2007. 
Fig. A.2. Charge-back ratios for credit card transactions by consumer country, in all shops 
Source: Pago e-Transaction Services GmbH, Pago Report, 2007. 
Fig. A.3. Charge-back ratios for credit card transactions by credit card brand and consumer country, in all shops 
As shown in Figure A.2, the overall average charge back ratio is around 0.33%. This ratio for transactions with German 
consumers is tremendously low, at 0.087%. Similarly, this ratio is low for consumers in the rest of Europe, at 0.058%. 
For consumers outside Europe and for UK consumers, the ratios are 0.422% and 0.214%, respectively. For consumers 
from outside Europe the chargeback ratio fell but is still the highest between all groups. It should be emphasized that 
this situation differs from 2004; in 2004 no consumer group achieved a chargeback ratio less than 0.10%. As a 
conclusion, non-payment risks no longer present a significant problem for e-commerce. 
The non-payment risk and credit card brand vary depending on different groups as shown in Figure A.3. For users from 
Germany and the rest of Europe, it is quite clear that both Visa and MasterCard ratios are quite low compared with the 
same ratios for users outside Europe and even for UK users. 
* This is the worst value ever calculated in Pago Reports. 
